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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Quentin Nava contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
to sever the two charges in this case. The applicable precedent makes it clear that the alleged
similarities between the two charges are too unremarkable to justify joinder. As such, this Court
should reverse the order denying Mr. Nava’s motion to sever those charges, vacate the judgments
of conviction, and remand these cases for new, separate proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State decided, on its own, to join the charges in this case in a single complaint.
(R., pp.26-28.) Specifically, it charged Mr. Nava with committing lewd and lascivious conduct
on J.R.R., then, a few nights later, committing sex abuse on a different alleged victim, J.L.R.
(R., pp.26-28; see also R., pp.23-25 (affidavit of probable cause).) At the ensuing grand jury
hearing, each alleged victim testified that, during a multi-day family get-together at J.R.R.’s
house, she woke during the night to find Mr. Nava touching her inappropriately. (Conf. Ex.,
pp.133-36 (transcript of the grand jury proceedings).)1 J.L.R. reported she was able to stop the
touching by confronting Mr. Nava and going upstairs to report the incident to her aunt (who was
also J.R.R.’s mother). (Conf. Ex., p.134; R., pp.24-25.) J.R.R. reported she had “freaked out”
when she had woken up, though she said she thought it might have been a dream. (Conf. Ex.,
p.136; R., pp.24-25.)
There were no allegations about any other conduct by Mr. Nava other than that he had
given up his ticket for a ride during a family trip to the fair so that J.L.R. could ride with an

1

“Conf. Ex.” refers to the electronic document “Nava Confidential Exhibits #45463.”
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unidentified cousin instead. (Conf. Ex., p.134; see generally Conf. Ex., pp.133-36; R., pp.2325.) J.L.R. and J.R.R. both requested that no physical examination be performed. (See R., p.25.)
The grand jury returned an indictment identical to the complaint. (R., pp.49-53.)
Mr. Nava moved to sever the two charges, arguing they were not properly joined because
the two acts were not part of the same transaction nor were they part of a common scheme or
plan. (R., pp.78-80.) In response, the State revealed it intended to introduce evidence at trial
which, in the State’s opinion, would show “grooming behaviors” – that Mr. Nava had focused
attention on the alleged victims and had given them preferential treatment, such as by sometimes
buying them Dutch Bros’ coffee, though the prosecutor acknowledged Mr. Nava would treat the
alleged victims’ siblings too, if asked. (See Tr., p.19, L.1 - p.23, L.24; R., pp.96-97.)
At the hearing on his motion, Mr. Nava’s attorney provided additional allegations
regarding the incident, clarifying, for example, that Mr. Nava had been in a romantic relationship
with J.R.R.’s mother, and it was she who had invited not only Mr. Nava, but his nephew as well,
to the family gathering. (Tr., p.9, Ls.9-14, p.13, Ls.16-18.) Defense counsel also alleged that the
nephew, who stayed near his uncle during that event, said he did not see Mr. Nava act any
differently toward the alleged victims than the other people there. (Tr., p.14, Ls.1-19.)
The district court recognized the following similarities existed between the allegations on
each charge: that both charged acts allegedly occurred in the same room of the same house,
occurred during the same time period, and involved the same type of alleged victim. (Tr., p.26,
Ls.5-9.) It also concluded the alleged grooming behavior was sufficient to show a common plan.
(Tr., p.26, Ls.12-18.)

In addition, it concluded each alleged victim’s testimony would be

admissible in the other’s trial under I.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of opportunity and, despite the
possibility of that the jury would consider that evidence as propensity evidence, the risk of
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prejudice would not substantially outweigh the probative value of that evidence. (Tr., p.27, L.10
- p.28, L.17.) As such, it denied Mr. Nava’s motion to sever the charges. (Tr., p.28, L.24 - p.29,
L.1; R., p.116.) In reaching that decision, the district court acknowledged that there were
different defenses available in regard to the two charges, given the allegations that J.R.R.’s
disclosure had been tainted by her hearing about J.L.R.’s disclosure. (See Tr., p.28, Ls.1-8.)
A jury subsequently convicted Mr. Nava on both charges. (R., pp.194-95.) Thereafter,
he admitted to a pair of alleged enhancements. (See Tr., p.903, L.1 - p.910, L.21.) The district
court ultimately imposed an aggregate sentence of forty years, with eighteen years fixed.
(R., pp.217-18.) Mr. Nava filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.212-14.)

3

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Nava’s motion to sever the charges in this case.

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Nava’s Motion To Sever The Charges In This Case

A.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 allows a defendant to move to sever two charges if presenting

those charges in a single trial would be prejudicial. State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 760
(2015). In cases like Mr. Nava’s, “the alleged prejudice is often that evidence of the defendant’s
conduct which would be admissible in the prosecution of one offense would not be admissible
under Evidence Rule 404(b) in the prosecution of the other offense if it were tried separately.”
Id. “In that circumstance, the analysis is the same as to whether the offenses are part of a
common scheme or plan permitting joinder under Criminal Rule 8(a) and whether the defendant
would be prejudiced by joinder because the offenses were not part of a common scheme or plan
under Evidence Rule 404(b).” Id. In conducting that analysis, the appellate courts review the
alleged facts, not the evidence subsequently produced at trial. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565
(2007).
Since the applicable analysis is the same as is used under I.C.R. 8, “[w]hether a court
improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of law, over which this Court
exercises free review.” Field, 144 Idaho at 564-65 (specifically evaluating the district court’s
grant of a motion for joinder under I.C.R. 8 over the defendant’s objection). However, in
Orellana-Castro, the Court also said the question of whether joinder was proper is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 760 (citing State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho
532, 537 (1991)); see also Field, 144 Idaho at 564-65 (stating the applicable standard of review
for the denial of a motion to sever under I.C.R. 14 is abuse of discretion because there is a
presumption that the initial decision to join the cases was appropriate).

5

The confusion between Field and Orellana-Castro in regard to the applicable standard of
review appears to be caused by two factors. The first is related to the procedural footing on
which the issue was presented to the district court. Mr. Nava’s motion to sever was the first
point at which the district court was asked to consider the legal propriety of the initial joinder.
Thus, Field’s presumption does not appear to be applicable, since it assumes the district court
has already made a ruling on the propriety of the joinder when the defendant brings a motion to
sever under I.C.R. 14. As such, where the motion to sever is the first opportunity the district
court has to consider whether the State’s independent decision to join the charges in the first
place was legally proper, the appellate review is essentially the same as would be conducted
under I.C.R. 8, and so, the applicable standard of review should be de novo. See also OrellanaCastro, 158 Idaho at 760 (noting that a defendant’s motion to sever and a defendant’s objection
to a motion for joinder are procedural equivalents in regard to preserving the issue of proper
joinder for appeal, with the form being dictated by “whichever applies” to the procedural stance
in which the issue approaches the district court).
That is particularly true in a case like Mr. Nava’s, where the prosecutor presents new
allegations in response to the motion to sever, and so, is effectively asking the district court to
consider a new basis to join the charges under I.C.R. 8. (See Tr., p.26, Ls.12-13 (the district
court acknowledging that defense counsel did not have the information underlying the
prosecutor’s allegations of grooming behavior prior to filing the motion to sever).) The ruling on
such a motion is de novo. Field, 144 Idaho at 564-65.
The second factor contributing to the confusion is that the question of joinder actually
presents a mixed question of fact (what allegations were made in regard to each charge) and of
law (whether those allegations are sufficiently similar for the charges to be properly joined under
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the law). As a result, the applicable analysis encompasses both standards of review: the district
court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, whereas the district
court’s application of the law to those facts will be reviewed de novo.

Compare, e.g.,

Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 717 (2017) (discussing this standard in regard to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612 (2000) (same in regard to a
decision on a motion to suppress evidence). Since there is no dispute as to what facts were
alleged regarding the charges in this case, the appellate review is focused on the district court’s
application of the law to those facts. Again, that indicates that the applicable standard of review
in this appeal should be de novo.
That conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that Orellana-Castro explained the
proper analysis in this regard is the same as the analysis used under I.C.R. 404(b). See OrellanaCastro, 158 Idaho at 760. The question is whether there was sufficient allegations to show a
common scheme or plan, and under I.C.R. 404(b), this Court freely reviews the district court’s
decision regarding whether evidence is relevant to topics such as plan. 2 See, e.g., State v. Joy,
155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013).

2

Though similar in nature to the analysis under I.C.R. 8, the determination of whether the
evidence regarding the other charge would be admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) is “only a factor in
determining whether a proper joinder was prejudicial and not whether joinder is proper in the
first place.” Field, 144 Idaho at 565 n.2 (2007). As such, the district court’s determination that
each victim’s testimony might also be relevant in the other’s case as evidence of opportunity
(Tr., p.28, Ls.13-17) is irrelevant to the analysis of the legal question regarding whether the
joinder was appropriate in the first place.
Even if it was necessary for the district court to consider whether the joinder was
prejudicial, the district court’s analysis in that regard is inconsistent with the applicable legal
standards. In an opinion issued a few months before the hearing on Mr. Nava’s motion to sever,
the Court of Appeals considered a case factually similar to Mr. Nava’s. See State v. Sanchez,
161 Idaho 727 (Ct. App. 2017). There, as here, there were two alleged victims and no physical
evidence, which meant the case turned solely on the credibility of the victims. Id. at 734. In that
scenario, “additional testimony from another sexually abused child would have carried an
especially high risk of infecting the trial by artificially enhancing the victim’s credibility.” Id.;
7

However, there is even confusion in that respect, as Orellana-Castro says that the
admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. OrellanaCastro, 158 Idaho at 760 (citing State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 690 (2012)). That confusion is
easily resolved since Pepcorn actually used the same standard as Joy did: “Whether evidence is
relevant is a question this Court will review de novo, but an abuse of discretion standard is used
when reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit evidence.” Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 686; see also
Don Burnett, “Standards of Appellate Review,” Idaho Appellate Handbook, 5th ed., 174
(October 2017) (explaining that the characterization of the admission of evidence as
“discretionary” is “unduly broad. The law of evidence is populated with rules, embodied in case
law and in the Idaho Rules of Evidence, that trial courts have no ‘discretion’ to disregard. Where
compliance with such rules is at issue, the proper appellate standard is free review, not abuse of
discretion.”).
For all those reasons, the applicable standard for reviewing the district court’s legal
determination that the charges in this case were properly joined is free review.3

accord Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 763 (“The existence of two accusers would enhance their
credibility.”). As a result, “the overwhelming effect of the evidence would have emphasized [the
defendant’s] propensity to commit sex crimes.” Sanchez, 161 Idaho at 734. (emphasis from
original). In that scenario, the Court of Appeals held that even though such evidence might be
relevant to opportunity, the risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighed that probative value
of that evidence. Id.; see also State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54 (2009) (quoting Field, 147 Idaho
at 570) (“‘there must be limits on the use of bad acts evidence to show a common scheme or plan
in sexual abuse cases’”).
That means the district court’s conclusion – that the risk of the same sort of prejudice did
not substantially outweigh the probative value of the same sort of evidence – was directly
contrary to the applicable legal standards, and thus, was an abuse of its discretion. See State v.
Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013) (noting the district court’s determination regarding whether the risk of
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value under I.R.E. 404(b) is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion); State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (explaining a district court
abuses its discretion, inter alia, when it acts inconsistent with the applicable legal standards).
3
Even if this Court were to use an abuse of discretion standard, it should still reverse the denial
of Mr. Nava’s motion to sever because, for the reasons discussed infra, that decision was not
8

B.

The Two Offenses Charged In This Case Were Not Part Of A Common Scheme Or Plan,
And So, Joinder Was Improper
In the joinder context, a common scheme or plan “must be linked by common

characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively
tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts.” State v. Comer, 162 Idaho 661,
664 (Ct. App. 2017). Thus, in order to show a common scheme or plan, the facts “must embrace
the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the other.”

Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762 (emphasis from original); accord

State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 (2010); State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54-55 (2009).
This is a high standard for the State to meet. For example, a few months before the
district court ruled on Mr. Nava’s motion to sever, in a case factually similar to Mr. Nava’s, the
Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that joinder was proper based on the allegations
that: “(1) the acts took place in the same span of months during 2006; (2) the victims were the
same age and gender; (3) the acts of abuse were very similar; and (4) the acts took place in the
Sanchez family home while the victims were in the car of Sanchez and his wife.” State v.
Sanchez, 161 Idaho 727, 731 (Ct. App. 2017). The Sanchez Court provided a detailed review of
the applicable Idaho Supreme Court precedent and concluded that “joinder was improper here
because, as in Johnson and Field, the similarities in the charged conduct and the victims are ‘far

consistent with the applicable legal standards, and therefore, fails on the second prong of the test
for abuse of discretion. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600; compare State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53,
72-76 (2011) (explaining that “[t]his Court reviews a denial of a motion for new trial for an
abuse of discretion. Because a motion for new trial involves mixed questions of law and fact, an
abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence or if the trial court does not correctly apply the law,” and holding the district
court in that case failed in the latter respect) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
9

too unremarkable’ to imply a common scheme or plan.”4 Sanchez, 161 Idaho at 732; accord
Comer, 162 Idaho at 665 (reaching the same conclusion a few months later). The majority of the
similarities described by the district court in this case are the same unremarkable similarities that
existed in Sanchez and Comer – that the alleged abuse occurred in the same location and around
the same time to similar alleged victims. (See Tr., p.26, Ls.5-9.)
As in Sanchez, there was one additional factor on which the district court tried to rely to
justify the joinder. See Sanchez, 161 Idaho at 731 (rejecting the idea that the fact that the abuse
occurred in the defendant’s house while the alleged victims were under his care showed a
common plan). In Mr. Nava’s case, it was the allegations of “grooming behaviors” under
State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89 (1984). (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-18.)
As an initial note, the prosecutor indicated that there is a question as to whether
Schwartzmiller remains good law. (See Tr., p.18, L.24 - p.19, L.5 (“it’s an older case, so I’m not
sure if it’s true anymore”).) In fact, it would not be surprising if Schwartzmiller has been
abrogated by Grist and its progeny. See, e.g., Sanchez, 161 Idaho at 731-32 (recognizing that
Grist and its progeny implicitly overruled the Court of Appeals’ prior decision in State v.
Longoria, 133 Idaho 819 (Ct. App. 1999)).5

That is because Grist expressly overruled

State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 746 (1991), which, in turn, relied on Schwartzmiller. Grist, 147
Idaho at 54. Grist explained that, under the analysis endorsed by Moore, improper propensity

4

In Johnson, the similarities were that the alleged victims were of similar age and gender, both
viewed the defendant as an “authority figure,” and the alleged acts of abuse were similar.
Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668-69. In Field, the similarities were that the defendant, while
babysitting the alleged victims in his home, would ask them to sit near him, begin to
“innocently” touch them, then engage in similar types of improper touching. See Field, 144
Idaho at 566.
5
The prosecutor actually relied on Longoria while objecting to Mr. Nava’s motion to sever. (See
R., p.93.)
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evidence was being admitted in sexual abuse cases. Id. As such, Grist is a watershed opinion
which reoriented the way in which courts approach this sort of evidence.

Therefore,

Schwartzmiller’s continuing usefulness has, at least, been restricted, if not abrogated entirely, by
Grist’s rejection of the analysis underlying its decision.
At any rate, Sanchez makes it clear that the district court’s reliance on Schwartzmiller
was misplaced since Sanchez expressly distinguished facts similar to those in Mr. Nava’s case
from the facts in Schwartzmiller, where the defendant “took affirmative steps to select and entice
his victims.” Sanchez, 161 Idaho at 732. Specifically, the defendant in Schwartzmiller engaged
in overt predatory behavior, as he “frequents areas where young boys may be found [specifically,
a junior high school and nearby restaurant], befriends boys with no father figure in the home,
entices them from their homes, lowers their natural inhibitions through the use of drugs and
alcohol, and commits sex acts upon them.” Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho at 91.
The allegations in this case are, like the allegations in Sanchez, a far cry from the
affirmative steps the defendant undertook in Schwartzmiller.

There was no allegation that

Mr. Nava enticed either alleged victim from her home or isolated them in his home as the
defendant in Schwartzmiller, or even the defendants in Sanchez and Comer, did. There was no
allegation that Mr. Nava plied either alleged victim with drugs or alcohol in an effort to lower
her natural inhibitions as the defendant in Schwartzmiller did. Compare State v. Coleman, 152
Idaho 872, 877 (Ct. App. 2012) (distinguishing State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19 (Ct. App.
1994), in which the alleged “grooming” was “drugs and alcohol [being] employed as a direct
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‘method of seducing or lowering the resistance of the victim and rewarding her for submission to
his sexual demands’”).6
Finally, the alleged grooming in this case does not reveal the same pattern of pervasive
efforts to seduce the intended victim into a “consensual” sexual encounter that was evident in
Schwartzmiller. In fact, Idaho’s appellate courts have made it clear that “[c]are must be taken in
order that prior acts evidence is not bundled into an official-sounding theory and coupled with
expert testimony in order to increase its apparent value in demonstrating a ‘plan’ or malevolent
intent by the defendant.” Coleman, 152 Idaho at 878; accord Grist, 147 Idaho at 54 (quoting
Field, 147 Idaho at 570) (“‘there must be limits on the use of bad acts evidence to show a
common scheme or plan in sexual abuse cases’”).
As such, the concept of “grooming” in cases such as Mr. Nava’s is limited to “conduct
intended to foster trust and remove defenses over time through a pattern of seduction and
preparation, resulting in the child being willing and compliant to the defendant’s sexual abuse”;
it is a “systematic pattern of conduct designed to progress a trusting relationship with the child.”
Coleman, 152 Idaho at 877 (emphasis added); accord State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 101 (2014)
(quoting State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 722 (Ct. App. 2010)) (explaining that “grooming” is a
“‘continuing criminal design to cultivate a relationship with [the victim] such that she would
concede to his demands’”) (alteration from original). Thus, for acts such as innocuous giftgiving (i.e., buying coffee for the alleged victims) to properly be described as “grooming,” they
need to be repeated as part of a progressing relationship.

6

Coleman, 152 Idaho at 877

In Coleman, the Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that allegations that the
defendant had tried to previously remove the victim’s pants while she was asleep and alone with
the defendant (he claimed he was putting pajamas on her), and pressing her to talk about her
stepfather despite knowing it was an uncomfortable topic, were admissible under I.R.E. 404(b)
as evidence of grooming, and thus, of plan. Coleman, 152 Idaho 872.
12

(distinguishing the isolated, single-occurrence incidents in that case from Truman, where there
was “a clear pattern of repeated criminal and sexual conduct: rewards and punishments based on
compliance with Truman’s sexual demands; sexualized comments and sexual acts occurring over
the course of a year; and showing the victim pornography on multiple occasions”).
In other words: “While evidence of grooming without overt sexual content may be
relevant, it still must tend to establish a pattern of behavior towards the ends presumed by the use
of the word ‘grooming.’” Id. “Amorphous pattern[s],” such as those which do not indicate a
progression in the relationship toward the sexual conduct, are not sufficient to meet this
threshold. Id. at 878; compare Field, 144 Idaho at 566-67 (holding that even allegations that the
abuses “began with ‘innocent’ touching [were] insufficient to prove a common scheme or plan”
because such allegations do not show the same pattern of “striking similarities” that was evident
in Schwartzmiller). As a result, such amorphous patterns are insufficient to show a common
scheme or plan. Coleman, 152 Idaho at 877.
The allegations the district court relied on as “grooming behavior” in Mr. Nava’s case are
much more similar to the amorphous patterns in Coleman or Field then the deliberate,
progressive actions in Schwartzmiller and Truman. Unlike Schwartzmiller and Truman, there
were no allegations that Mr. Nava made any request of the alleged victims, sexual or otherwise,
nor were there allegations that he discussed sexual topics with them as part of a progressing
relationship to make them more compliant. (See generally Conf. Ex., pp.133-36; R., pp.23-25.)
As such, there were no allegations of a progression in the alleged relationship between Mr. Nava
and the alleged victims, nor were there any allegations that either alleged victim had become
more willing or complaint toward Mr. Nava. In fact, J.L.R.’s allegations reveal precisely the
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opposite as she said she immediately put a stop to Mr. Nava’s alleged actions on the night in
question. (Conf. Ex., p.134.)
Furthermore, the isolated allegation that Mr. Nava would buy the alleged victims Dutch
Bros coffee does not indicate a systematic pattern to progress a relationship with them toward a
sexual encounter. That is particularly evident from the fact that Mr. Nava would treat the alleged
victims’ siblings in the same way. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.7-12.) As a result, the allegations in this
case do not show the necessary systematic pattern of behavior progressing the relationships
toward the sexual conduct, which means the allegations here, like those in Coleman, are not
properly considered “grooming.”
Rather, this is another case, like Sanchez, Comer, Coleman, Field, Johnson, and Grist,
where the alleged acts of abuse “more accurately evidences an opportunistic tendency that is
unfortunately entirely unremarkable in sexual abuse cases.” Sanchez, 161 Idaho at 732. As
such, there was no evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond Mr. Nava’s alleged propensity
to commit sex crimes, and that means the district court’s legal conclusion – that joinder of these
two charges was proper – was erroneous.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Nava respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to sever
the charges and remand these cases for separate trials.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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